National Taxation, Fiscal Federalism and Global Taxation

fiscal federalism, equalization, development finance

The Dual Income Tax System - An Overview

Einkommensteuer, Doppelbesteuerung, Verbrauchsteuer, Steuersystem, OECD-Staaten, Income tax, Double taxation, Consumption tax, Tax system, OECD countries

PRINCIPLES OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

This paper summarizes the procedure for the economic evaluation of government projects and policy reforms. It begins with the social welfare function underpinnings of cost-benefit analysis including the role of distributive weights and the choice of numeraire. It then turns to the conduct of a social cost-benefit analysis using the net present value criterion. This includes the shadow pricing of market products and inputs affected by the project, indirect welfare effects, the opportunity cost of project finance, the evaluation of non-marketed inputs and outputs, and the opportunity cost of risk. Issues involved in selecting a discount rate are discussed, especially those arising from imperfect capital markets. Finally, since many public projects have long-term consequences, the principles that might be used to take account of effects of projects on future generations are outlined. Techniques for accounting for these effects, such as generational accounting, are summarized and its shortcomings highlighted.evaluation, government projects, policy reforms, imperfect capital markets, generational accounting, shadow pricing

Indirect Taxation and Redistribution: The Scope of the Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem

The Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem states that if labor is weakly separable from goods in household utility functions, differential commodity taxation should not be not part of an optimal redistributive tax system. This Theorem, which is arguable the most policy-relevant result to come out of the optimal income tax literature, has come under considerable scrutiny in the literature. We consider how robust it is with respect to differences in needs or endowments of goods, more than one type of labor supply, differences in preference for leisure, and restrictions on policy instruments.Optimal Taxation, Indirect Taxation

Indirect Taxes for Redistribution: Should Necessity Goods be Favored?

Atkinson and Stiglitz show that with weakly separability, differential commodity taxes are unnecessary given an optimal nonlinear income tax. Deaton showed that with an optimal linear progressive income tax, commodity taxes are superfluous under weakly separable and linear Engel curves. Using the latter case as an example, we derive two main results. If the income tax is less progressive than optimal, necessities should bear a lower tax rate than luxuries. If low-income households are income-constrained so cannot afford luxuries, it may be optimal to tax necessities at higher rates than luxuries, depending whether labor varies along the intensive or extensive margin.optimal income tax, Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem, indirect taxes

Optimal Marginal and Average Income Taxation under Maxi-min

Using the Mirrlees optimal income tax model with a maxi-min social welfare function, we derive conditions for a decreasing marginal tax rate throughout the skill distribution, a strictly concave tax function in income and a single-peaked average tax schedule. With additive preferences and a constant labor supply elasticity, marginal tax rates are decreasing below the modal skill level, and will also decrease above the mode if aggregate skills are non-decreasing with the skill level. In this case and with a bounded skill distribution or with a constant hazard rate, the tax function is strictly concave in income and the average tax rate single-peaked. When quasilinear utility functions apply in either consumption or leisure, under fairly mild restrictions on the truncated or untruncated distribution function, marginal tax rates are decreasing in skill and the average tax profile is sinlgle-peaked. The distribution of skills has the same qualitative influence for either case of quasilinearity. These results continue to hold when there is bunching at the bottom due to a binding non-negativity constraint. We also illustrate how relaxing the assumption of constant elasticity of labor supply, generally used in the literature, modifies the results.maxi-min, optimal income taxation

Bureaucratic Advice and Political Governance

Politicians typically do not know what policies are best for achieving their broad objectives, so rely on bureaucrats for advice. Bureaucrats are better informed, so can manipulate outcomes by proposing policies that suit their interests. We capture this conflict of interests using a model of political decision-making that focuses on the interaction between politicians and the bureaucracies that advise them. In the basic model, a representative bureaucrat, knowing the characteristics of a given project, recommends to a representative politician whether to adopt it. If the politician chooses to adopt the project, its characteristics are revealed ex post. On the basis of the revealed outcome, the politician decides whether to discipline the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat anticipates imperfectly the chances of discipline when making an ex ante recommendation. When project characteristics are multi-dimensional, the politician can choose whether to seek advice from one bureaucrat or more than one. We compare outcomes in these centralized and decentralized regimes.bureaucracy, governance

Optimal Income Taxation with Uncertain Earnings: A Synthesis

We study optimal nonlinear income taxation when earnings can differ because of both ability and luck, so the income tax has both a redistributive role and an insurance role. A substantial literature on optimal redistribution in the absence of uncertainty has evolved since Mirrlees’ original contribution. The literature on the income tax as a social insurance device is more limited. It has largely assumed that households are ex ante identical so unequal earnings are due to uncertainty alone. We provide a general treatment of the optimal income tax under uncertainty when households differ in ability. We characterize optimal marginal tax rates and interpret them in terms of redistribution, insurance and incentive effects. The case of ex ante identical households and the no-risk case with heterogeneous abilities come out as special cases.optimal income taxation, wage risk

Financing New Investments under Asymmetric Information: A General Approach

We study the efficiency of credit market equilibria when financial intermediaries cannot observe the riskiness or the returns of potential investment projects. With loan financing, there is over-investment in high-return, high-risk projects and under-investment in low-return, low-risk projects relative to the social optimum. If firms have the choice of equity finance, there is unambiguously over-investment under reasonable conditions. The well-known cases of Stiglitz and Weiss and of de Meza and Webb emerge as special cases. The results are extended to allow for signaling and screening equilibria.Credit Markets, Asymmetric Information

How tax incentives affect decisions to invest in developing countries

The authors contend that in evaluating and designing investment incentives in developing economies, analysts should consider their effect on: the marginal effective tax rate (METR). Even simple tax incentives can perversely affect the METR. Many schemes have relatively generous write-offs to begin with, so generous that a negative marginal effective tax rate is not uncommon. In these circumstances, tax rate reductions (including tax holidays) can discourage investment. Investment tax credits are more likely to be effective. Loss firms. Incentives that do not have generous loss-offsetting or refundability provisions willbe of limited use to firms likely to suffer losses (including small growing firms and firms in risky environments). Cash flows. Incentives that improve firms'cash flows may be more effective than those that do not. Refundability may be important here. Simply adopting cash-flow costing principles with refundability may be more effective than reducing tax rates. Foreign-owned firms. If the value of a tax incentive is fully offset by reduced credits for foreign taxes, the incentive effect will probably be minimal. Capital allocation among assets. Some measures favor short- over long-lived capital, machinery over inventory, some industries over others. Incentives that encourage investment selectively may cause distortions in the way capital is allocated. Other factors to be considered in designing tax incentives: inflation, which is typically high in developing economies. Incentives should offset the effects of inflation; tax evasion, a common problem in developing countries; technology transfer; the fulfillment of social, environmental, and regional non-economic objectives; the effects on firms'organization (do the incentives encourage mergers, takeovers, or bankruptcy?)Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Banks&Banking Reform